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Abstract
Momentum is a variant of gradient descent that
has been proposed for its benefits on convergence.
In a distributed setting, momentum can be im-
plemented either at the server or the worker side.
When the aggregation rule used by the server is
linear, commutativity with addition makes both
deployments equivalent. Robustness and privacy
are however among motivations to abandon lin-
ear aggregation rules. In this work, we demon-
strate the benefits on robustness of using mo-
mentum at the worker side. We first prove that
computing momentum at the workers reduces the
variance-norm ratio of the gradient estimation at
the server, strengthening Byzantine resilient ag-
gregation rules. We then provide an extensive ex-
perimental demonstration of the robustness effect
of worker-side momentum on distributed SGD.
1. Introduction
Gradient descent is the driving force of the recent successes
in machine learning. Large-scale deployment of gradient
descent relies on two ideas: stochastic approximation and
distribution. Stochastic approximation (drastically) reduces
the computation time, at the price of introducing variance
in the gradient estimations. Distribution alleviates the work-
load on a single machine but, as we discuss below, the
multiplicity of elements inevitably increases the likelihood
of (malicious) faults.
In the distributed parameter server setting, the training of a
model is basically performed as follows. A central machine,
called the server, sends the current model (the vector of
parameters) to other machines, called workers. These use
their share of data (either their local and private data, or
data provided by the server for training purpose) to compute
a gradient estimate which is in turn sent to the server. As
the server receives the gradients from different workers, the
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Figure 1. A parameter server setup with n = 8 workers, among
which f = 3 are Byzantine (i.e., adversarial) workers. A black
line represents a bidirectional communication channel.
server typically averages their values to update the model if
the setting is synchronous, or updates the model as individ-
ual gradients are received if the model is asynchronous.
When all the workers are reliable and provide correct es-
timates of the gradient, this setting has close to optimal
behavior (Lian et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2016; Dean et al.,
2012). Many practical factors could however make the cor-
rectness assumption of the workers doubtful. These factors
span a large spectrum of causes, from software bugs, noisy
or poisonous data, stale machines or worse, malicious at-
tackers controlling some machines.
The Byzantine abstraction is a very general fault model in
distributed systems (Lamport et al., 1982). The standard,
golden solution for Byzantine fault tolerance is the state
machine replication approach (Schneider, 1990). This ap-
proach is however based on replication, which is unsuitable
for distributed machine learning and stochastic gradient de-
scent, such as federated learning (Konecny´ et al., 2015).
Workers could be independent entities, who could not be
replicated for obvious privacy, scalability or legal reasons.
For instance, in the context of federated learning, recent
work has shown that Byzantine fault tolerance serves as a
good basis to study poisoning (Bagdasaryan et al., 2018; Sun
et al., 2019). In that same context, recent results show that
Byzantine-resilient aggregation rules are effective against
distributed backdoor attacks (Xie et al., 2020).
The key vulnerability in the standard parameter server rests
upon how gradients are aggregated. Since 2017, many al-
ternatives to averaging have been proposed: (Alistarh et al.,
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2018; Chen et al., 2018; Yin et al., 2018; Xie et al., 2018a;
Blanchard et al., 2017; El-Mhamdi et al., 2018; Damaskinos
et al., 2018; Yang & Bajwa, 2019b; TianXiang et al., 2019;
Bernstein et al., 2019; Xie et al., 2018a; Yang & Bajwa,
2019a; Chen et al., 2018; Xie et al., 2018b; Yang et al.,
2019; Rajput et al., 2019; Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al., 2019) to
list a few. In synchronous settings, these solutions consists
in replacing the averaging of gradients by a robust alterna-
tive such as the median and its variants (Blanchard et al.,
2017; El-Mhamdi et al., 2018; Xie et al., 2018a) or redun-
dancy schemes (Chen et al., 2018; Rajput et al., 2019). In
asynchronous settings, since no aggregation can be made,
gradients are (ideally) used individually as they are deliv-
ered, the robust alternatives are less diverse and are mostly
consisting of a filtering scheme (Damaskinos et al., 2018).
One common aspect underlying these methods is their re-
liance on “quality gradients” from the non-Byzantine work-
ers. Technically: the variance between non-Byzantine gra-
dient estimates must be bounded below a factor of their
average norm. This requirement is not new in machine
learning (Bottou, 1998), and is actually independent from
Byzantine considerations as an unbounded variance-norm
ratio would prevent convergence.
Is there a way to guarantee “quality gradient” at the non
Byzantine workers? Addressing this question is crucial to
put Byzantine-resilient gradient descent to work.
We provide a positive answer to this question by using mo-
mentum (Rumelhart et al., 1986). Momentum consists in
summing a series of past gradients with the new one using
an exponential decay factor µ (0 < µ < 1), instead of using
the new gradient alone. Momentum can be computed at the
server side, when the update is performed, or at the workers’
side, when gradients are still computed (Lin et al., 2018).
In non Byzantine-resilient settings, both deployments are
equivalent, as the gradient aggregation used at the server is
linear and commutes with addition. In practice, momentum
is typically employed at the server side. In this work, we
propose to use momentum at the workers’ side since none of
the existing Byzantine-resilient aggregation rules is linear.
We first show theoretically that indeed we can guarantee
“quality gradient” by using momentum at the workers. Then
we report on an extensive experimental assessment of this
claim. In particular, and while using momentum at the
workers has no additional overhead over momentum at the
server, this technique led to an observed ×11 reduction on
cross-accuracy drop due to Byzantine actors (Section 4.3).
Contributions. Essentially, we show for the first time that
applying momentum at the workers significantly boosts ro-
bustness against Byzantine behavior. We prove that comput-
ing momentum at the workers reduces the variance-norm
ratio of the honest gradient estimations at the server, a key
quantity for any robust alternative to averaging which ap-
proximates a high-dimensional median; for instance (Blan-
chard et al., 2017; Xie et al., 2018a; El-Mhamdi et al., 2018).
In particular, we show that combining now-standard defense
mechanisms (Blanchard et al., 2017; Xie et al., 2018a; El-
Mhamdi et al., 2018) with momentum (at the worker side)
ensures previously unavailable safety guarantees and coun-
ters state-of-the-art attacks such as (Baruch et al., 2019;
Xie et al., 2019). We report on an extensive experimental
evaluation of this claim with 88 different tested sets of hy-
perparameters (440 trained models in total), spanning the 2
mentioned state-of-the-art attacks and 3 defenses.
Paper Organization. Section 2 formalizes the problem
and provides the necessary background. Section 3 presents
our theoretical contribution and compares the usage of mo-
mentum at the workers versus at the server. Section 4
describes our experimental settings in details, before pre-
senting and analysing our experimental results. Section 5
discusses related and future work.
Due to space limitation, only a representative fraction of
the experimental results is presented in the main paper. The
supplementary material reports on the entirety of our exper-
iments, along with the code and procedure to reproduce all
of our results (including the graphs).
2. Background
2.1. Byzantine Distributed SGD
Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD). We consider the
classical problem of optimizing a non-convex, differen-
tiable loss function Q : Rd → R, where Q (θt) ,
E x∼D [q (θt, x)] for a fixed data distribution D. Namely,
we seek a θ∗ ∈ Rd such that: ∇Q (θ∗) = 0 (1)
Using SGD, we initially pick a random θ0 ∈ Rd. Then at
every step t ≥ 0, we uniformly sample b datapoints x1 . . . xb
from D to estimate a gradient gt , 1b
∑b
k=1∇q (θt, xk) ≈
∇Q (θt). Finally, for step t, we update the parameter vector
using θt+1 = θt − ηtgt, where ηt > 0 is the learning rate.
One field-tested amendment to this update rule is momen-
tum (Rumelhart et al., 1986), where each gradient has an
exponentially-decreasing effect on every subsequent update.
Formally: θt+1 = θt − ηt
∑t
u=0 µ
t−ugu, with 0 < µ < 1.
Distributed SGD with Byzantine workers. We follow
the parameter server model (Li et al., 2014): 1 process (the
parameter server) holding the parameter vector θt ∈ Rd,
and n other processes (the workers) estimating gradients.
Among these nworkers, up to f < n are said Byzantine, i.e.,
adversarial. Unlike the other n− f honest workers, these f
Byzantine workers can send arbitrary gradients (Figure 1).
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At each step t, the parameter server receives n different
gradients g(1)t . . . g
(n)
t , among which f are arbitrary (sent by
the Byzantine workers). So the update equation becomes:
θt+1 = θt − ηtGt
where: Gt ,
t∑
u=0
µt−uF
(
g(1)u , . . . , g
(n)
u
)
(2)
and where: F :
(
Rd
)n → Rd
The function F is called a Gradient Aggregation Rule (GAR).
If we assume no Byzantine worker, averaging is sufficient;
formally: F
(
g
(1)
t , . . . , g
(n)
t
)
= 1n
∑n
i=1 g
(i)
t . In the pres-
ence of Byzantine workers, a more complex aggregation
is performed with a Byzantine-resilient GAR. Section 2.2
presents the three Byzantine-resilient GARs studied in this
paper, along with their own theoretical requirements.
Adversarial Model. The goal of the adversary is to im-
pede the learning process, which can generally be defined
as the maximization of the loss Q or, more judiciously in
the image classification tasks used in this paper, as the mini-
mization1 of the model’s top-1 cross-accuracy.
The adversary cannot directly overwrite θt at the parameter
server. The adversary only submits f arbitrary gradients to
the server per step, via the f Byzantine workers it controls2.
We assume an omniscient adversary. In particular, the ad-
versary knows the GAR used by the parameter server and
can generate Byzantine gradients dependent on the honest
gradients submitted at the same step.
2.2. Byzantine-resilient GARs
We formally present below the 3 GARs studied in this paper.
These GARs are Byzantine-resilience, a notion first intro-
duced by (Blanchard et al., 2017) under the name (α, f)-
Byzantine-resilience. When used within its operating as-
sumptions, a Byzantine-resilient GAR guarantees conver-
gence (in the sense of (1)) even in an adversarial setting.
Definition 1. Let (α, f) ∈ [0..pi2 [× [0..n], with n the total
number of workers. Let
(
g
(1)
t . . . g
(n)
t
)
∈ (Rd)n, among
which n− f are independent (“honest”) vectors following
the same distribution Gt; the f other vectors are arbitrary,
each possibly dependent on Gt and the “honest” vectors.
A GAR F is said to be (α, f)-Byzantine resilient iff:
gt , F
(
g
(1)
t , . . . , g
(n)
t
)
satisfies:
1I.e., with 10 classes, the worst possible final accuracy is 0.1.
2Said otherwise, the f Byzantine workers can collude.
1. 〈E gt,EGt〉 ≥ (1− sinα) · ‖EGt‖ > 0
2. ∀r ∈ {2, 3, 4}, E ‖gt‖r is bounded above by a linear
combination of the terms E ‖Gt‖r1 . . . E ‖Gt‖rk , with
(k, r1 . . . rk) ∈ (N∗)k+1 and r1 + . . . + rk = r.
2.2.1. KRUM (BLANCHARD ET AL., 2017)
Let (f,m) ∈ N2, with n ≥ 2f + 3 and 1 ≤ m ≤ n− f − 2.
Krum works by assigning a score to each input gradient.
The score of g(i)t is the sum of the distances between g
(i)
t
and its n− f − 2 closest neighbor gradients. Krum outputs
the arithmetic mean of the m smallest–scoring gradients3.
In our experiments, we set m to its maximum: n− f − 2.
To be proven (α, f)-Byzantine resilient, besides the stan-
dard convergence conditions in non-convex optimization
(Bottou, 1998), Krum requires the honest gradients’ vari-
ance E ‖Gt − EGt‖2 to be bounded above as follows:
2 · κ(n, f) · E ‖Gt − EGt‖2 < ‖EGt‖2 (3)
with: κ(n, f) , n−f+ f (n−f−2)+f
2 (n−f−1)
n−2f−2
2.2.2. MEDIAN (XIE ET AL., 2018A)
Let f ∈ N with n ≥ 2f + 1.
Median computes the coordinate-wise median of the input
gradients g(1)t . . . g
(n)
t . Formally for the real-valued median:
median (x1 . . . xn) , arg min
x∈R
n∑
i=1
|xi − x|
And so, formally for the coordinate–wise Median:
Median
(
g
(1)
t . . . g
(n)
t
)
,
median
(
g
(1)
t [1]...g
(n)
t [1]
)
...
median
(
g
(1)
t [d]...g
(n)
t [d]
)

The condition of (α, f)-Byzantine resilience is:
(n− f) · E ‖Gt − EGt‖2 < ‖EGt‖2 (4)
2.2.3. BULYAN (EL-MHAMDI ET AL., 2018)
Bulyan uses another Byzantine-resilient GAR to aggregate
the input gradients. In the remaining of this paper we will
consider Bulyan of Krum, that we will simply call Bulyan.
Let (f,m) ∈ N2, with n ≥ 4f + 3 and 1 ≤ m ≤ n− f − 2.
Bulyan first selects n − 2f − 2 gradients by iterating n −
2f − 2 times over Krum, each time removing the highest
scoring gradient from the input gradient set. From these
n − 2f − 2 ≥ 2f + 1 selected gradients, Bulyan outputs
3The original paper called the GAR Multi-Krum when m > 1.
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the coordinate-wise average of the n− 4f − 2 ≥ 1 closest
coordinate values to the coordinate-wise median.
The theoretical requirements for the (α, f)-Byzantine re-
silience of Bulyan are the same as the ones of Krum.
2.3. Studied Attacks
The two, state-of-the-art attacks studied in this paper follow
the same core algorithm, that we identify below.
Let εt ∈ R≥0 be a non-negative factor, and at ∈ Rd an
attack vector which value depends on the actual attack used.
At each step t, each of the f Byzantine workers submits the
same Byzantine gradient: gt + εt · at (5), where gt is an
approximation of the real gradient∇Q (θt) at step t.
For both of the studied attacks, the value of εt is fixed.
2.3.1. A LITTLE IS ENOUGH (BARUCH ET AL., 2019)
In this attack, a Byzantine worker submits gt + εt · at, with
at , −σt the opposite of the coordinate-wise standard
deviation of the honest gradient distribution Gt.
2.3.2. FALL OF EMPIRES (XIE ET AL., 2019)
A Byzantine worker submits (1− εt) gt, i.e., at , −gt.
3. Momentum at the Workers
The Byzantine-resilience of Krum, Median and Bulyan rely
on the honest gradients being sufficiently clumped. For the
GARs we study, this is formalized in equations (3) and (4).
This requirement is theoretically important. When the vari-
ance of the honest gradients is too high compared to their
norms (e.g., Equation (3) unsatisfied), the Byzantine gradi-
ents can induce aggregated gradients having negative dot-
products with the real gradient, preventing convergence (as
such aggregated gradients would locally increase the loss).
This requirement is also not satisfied in practice. When
reproducing the attacks (figures 2 to 5), we measured and
observed that the honest gradients’ variance is often at least
one order of magnitude too large for all the studied GARs.
In the 400 experiments we performed under attack, we mea-
sured the theoretical requirement of Equation (3) is never
satisfied, not even for a single step, in 394 of them. Among
the 6 other experiments (all with the CIFAR-10 model),
equations (3) or (4) were never verified for more than 4
steps (out of 3000) per experiment.
Nevertheless, our empirical evidences show that reducing
the honest gradients’ variance relative to their norm can
be enough to defend the training against the two presented
attacks. In this section we present a technique aiming at
decreasing the variance-norm ratio of the honest gradients,
reducing or even cancelling at negligible computational
costs the effects of the attacks studied in this paper.
3.1. Formulation
From the formulation of momentum SGD (Equation (2)):
Gt ,
t∑
u=0
µt−uF
(
g(1)u , . . . , g
(n)
u
)
we instead confer the momentum operation on the workers:
Gt , F
( t∑
u=0
µt−ug(1)u︸ ︷︷ ︸
G
(1)
t
, . . . ,
t∑
u=0
µt−ug(n)u︸ ︷︷ ︸
G
(n)
t
)
(6)
Notations. In the remaining of this paper, we call the
original formulation (momentum) at the server, and the
proposed, revised formulation (momentum) at the workers.
3.2. Effects
We compare the variance-norm ratio when momentum is
computed at the server versus at the workers.
Let λt , ‖EGt‖ > 0 be the real gradient’s norm at step t.
Let σt ,
√
E ‖Gt − EGt‖2 be the standard deviation of
the real gradient at step t. The variance-norm ratio, when
momentum is computed at the server, is:
r
(s)
t ,
σt
2
λt
2
We will now compute this ratio when momentum is applied
at the workers. Let G(i)t , with G
(i)
−1 , 0, be the gradient
sent by any honest worker i at step t, i.e.:
G
(i)
t ,
t∑
u=0
µt−ug(i)u
Then, for any two honest worker identifiers i 6= j:
E
∥∥∥G(i)t −G(j)t ∥∥∥2
= E
∥∥∥g(i)t + µG(i)t−1 − g(j)t − µG(j)t−1∥∥∥2
= E
∥∥∥g(i)t − g(j)t ∥∥∥2 + µ2 E∥∥∥G(i)t−1 −G(j)t−1∥∥∥2
+ 2µ
E g(i)t − E g(j)t︸ ︷︷ ︸
=EGt−EGt
 · (EG(i)t−1 − EG(j)t−1)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= E
∥∥∥g(i)t − g(j)t ∥∥∥2 + µ2 E∥∥∥G(i)t−1 −G(j)t−1∥∥∥2
= 2σt
2 + µ2
(
2σt−1
2 + µ2
(
2σt−2
2 + µ2 (...)
))
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= 2
t∑
u=0
µ2(t−u)σu
2 (7)
= 2 E
∥∥∥G(i)t − EG(i)t ∥∥∥2
∥∥∥EG(i)t ∥∥∥2 = ∥∥∥E g(i)t + µ EG(i)t−1∥∥∥2
=
∥∥∥E g(i)t ∥∥∥2 + 2µ E g(i)t · EG(i)t−1 + µ2 ∥∥∥EG(i)t−1∥∥∥2
= λt
2 + 2µ E g(i)t ·
(
E g(i)t−1 + µ
(
E g(i)t−2 + µ (...)
))
+ µ2
(
λt−1
2 + 2µ E g(i)t−1 ·
(
E g(i)t−2 + µ (...)
)
+µ2 E
∥∥∥G(i)t−2∥∥∥2)
=
t∑
u=0
µ2(t−u)
λu2 + 2 u−1∑
v=0
µu−v E g(i)u · E g(i)v︸ ︷︷ ︸
=EGu·EGv

Thus, assuming honest gradients EG(i)t do not become null:
r
(w)
t ,
Ωt
2
Λt
2 =
∑t
u=0 µ
2(t−u)σu
2∑t
u=0 µ
2(t−u) (λu2 + su)
where the expected “straightness” of the gradient computed
by an honest worker at step u is defined by:
su , 2
u−1∑
v=0
µu−v EGu · EGv
su quantifies what can be thought as the curvature of the
honest gradient trajectory. Straight trajectories can make su
grow up to (1− µ)−1>1 times the expected squared-norm
of the honest gradients, while highly “curved” trajectories
(e.g., close to a local minimum) tend to make su negative.
This observation stresses that this formulation of momentum
can sometimes be harmful for the purpose of Byzantine
resilience. We measured su for every step u > 0 in our
experiments, and we always observed that this quantity is
positive and increases for a short window of (dozen) steps
(depending on ηt), and then oscillates between positive and
negative values. These two phases are noticeable in the first
steps of Figure 5. While the empirical impact (decreased or
cancelled loss in accuracy) is concrete, we believe there is
room for further improvements, discussed in Section 5.
The purpose of using momentum at the workers is to reduce
the variance-norm ratio r(w)t , compared to r
(s)
t . Since g
(i)
0 =
G
(i)
0 , we verify that r
(u)
0 = r
(w)
0 . Then, ∀t > 0:
r
(w)
t ≤ r(s)t ⇔
σt
2 + µ2 Ωt−1
2
λt
2 + st + µ2 Λt−1
2
≤ σt
2
λt
2
⇔ µ2 Ωt−12 λt2 ≤
(
st + µ
2 Λt−1
2
)
σt
2
⇔ st ≥ µ2 Λt−12
(
r
(w)
t−1
r
(s)
t
− 1
)
(8)
The condition for decreasing r(w)t can be obtained similarly:
r
(w)
t ≤ r(w)t−1 ⇔ st ≥ λt2
(
r
(s)
t
r
(w)
t−1
− 1
)
To study the impact of a lower learning rate ηt on st, we will
assume that the real gradient∇Q is l-Lipschitz. Namely:
∀ (t, u) ∈ N2, u < t, ‖EGt − EGu‖2 ≤ l2 ‖θt − θu‖
≤ l2
∥∥∥∥∥
t−1∑
v=u
ηv Gv
∥∥∥∥∥
Then, ∀ (t, u) ∈ N2, u < t, we can rewrite:
‖EGt − EGu‖2 = ‖EGt‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
λt
2
+ ‖EGu‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
λu
2
−2 EGt · EGu
And finally, we can lower-bound st as:
t−1∑
u=0
µt−u ‖EGt − EGu‖2
=
t−1∑
u=0
µt−u
(
λt
2 + λu
2
)− 2 t−1∑
u=0
µt−u EGt · EGu︸ ︷︷ ︸
st
≤
t−1∑
u=0
µt−u l2
∥∥∥∥∥
t−1∑
v=u
ηv Gv
∥∥∥∥∥
⇔ st ≥
t−1∑
u=0
µt−u
(
λt
2 + λu
2 − l2
∥∥∥∥∥
t−1∑
v=u
ηv Gv
∥∥∥∥∥
)
(9)
≥ 1− µ
t
1− µ λt
2 +
t−1∑
u=0
µt−u
(
λu
2 − l2
∥∥∥∥∥
t−1∑
v=u
ηv Gv
∥∥∥∥∥
)
When the real gradient∇Q is (locally) Lipschitz continuous,
reducing the learning rate ηt can suffice to ensure st satisfies
the conditions laid above for decreasing the variance-norm
ratio r(w)t ; the purpose of momentum at the workers.
Importantly this last lower bound, namely Equation (9), sets
how the practitioner should choose two hyperparameters,
µ and ηt, for the purpose of Byzantine-resilience. Basi-
cally, and as long as it does not harm the training without
adversary, µ should be set as high and ηt as low as possible.
As a side note, (Xie et al., 2019) is prone to increasing the
lower bound on st. Indeed, this attack submits gradients
smaller or opposed to the honest gradient (Section 2.3.2).
Such an attack can shorten the parameter trajectory, and so
can improve Byzantine-resilience in the ensuing step(s).
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4. Experiments
The goal of this section is to empirically verify our theo-
retical results, measuring the evolution of both the top-1
cross-accuracy and variance-norm ratio over the training.
Our experiments cover every possible combinations of 5 key
hyperparameters, including combinations used by (Baruch
et al., 2019; Xie et al., 2019). For reproducibility and confi-
dence in the results, each combination of hyperparameters
is repeated 5 times with seeds 1 to 5, totalling 440 different
runs. Besides observing the benefit of lower learning rates,
our results show tangible mitigation of both attacks.
4.1. Experimental Setup
We use a compact notation to define the models: L(#outputs)
for a fully-connected linear layer, R for ReLU activation,
S for log-softmax, C(#channels) for a fully-connected 2D-
convolutional layer (kernel size 3, padding 1, stride 1), M
for 2D-maxpool (kernel size 2), N for batch-normalization,
and D for dropout (with fixed probability 0.25).
We use the model and dataset from (Baruch et al., 2019):
Model (784)-L(100)-R-L(10)-R-S
Dataset MNIST (83 training points/gradient)
#workers n = 51 f ∈ {24, 12}
We also use the model and dataset from (Xie et al., 2019):
Model (3, 32×32)-C(64)-R-B-C(64)-R-B-M-D-
-C(128)-R-B-C(128)-R-B-M-D-
-L(128)-R-D-L(10)-S
Dataset CIFAR-10 (50 training points/gradient)
#workers n = 25 f ∈ {11, 5}
For model training, we use the negative log likelihood loss
and respectively 10−4 and 10−2 `2-regularization for the
MNIST and CIFAR-10 models. We also clip gradients,
ensuring their norms remain respectively below 2 and 5 for
the MNIST and CIFAR-10 models. For model evaluation,
we use the top-1 cross-accuracy on the whole testing set.
Both datasets are pre-processed before training. For MNIST
we apply the same pre-processing as in (Baruch et al., 2019):
an input image normalization with mean 0.1307 and stan-
dard deviation 0.3081. For CIFAR-10, besides including
horizontal flips of the input pictures, we also apply a per-
channel normalization with means 0.4914, 0.4822, 0.4465
and standard deviations 0.2023, 0.1994, 0.2010 (Liu, 2019).
We set f the number of Byzantine workers either to the
maximum for which Krum can be used (roughly an half:
f =
⌊
n−3
2
⌋
), or the maximum for Bulyan (roughly a quarter,
f =
⌊
n−3
4
⌋
). The attack factors εt (Section 2.3) are set to
constants proposed in the literature, namely εt = 1.5 for
(Baruch et al., 2019) and εt = 1.1 for (Xie et al., 2019).
Guided by our theoretical study on the impact of the learning
rate on the variance-norm ratio, for every pair model-attack
in our experiments we select two different learning rates.
The first and largest is selected so as to maximize the per-
formance (highest final cross-accuracy and accuracy gain
per step) of the model trained without Byzantine workers.
The second and smallest is chosen so as to minimize the per-
formance loss under attack, without substantially impacting
the final accuracy when trained without Byzantine workers.
The MNIST and CIFAR-10 model are trained respectively
with µ = 0.9 and µ = 0.99. These values were obtained by
trial and error, to maximize overall accuracy gain per step.
Our theoretical analysis highlights two metrics: the top-1
cross-accuracy, measuring the performance of the model,
and the variance-norm ratio, i.e. either r(s)t or r
(w)
t in ac-
cordance with where momentum was carried out. Each
experiment is run 5 times. We present the average and
standard deviation of the two metrics over these 5 runs.
4.2. Reproducibility
Particular care has been taken to make our results repro-
ducible. Each of the 5 runs per experiment are respectively
seeded with seed 1 to 5. For instance, this implies that two
experiments with same seed and same model also starts
with the same parameters θ0. To further reduce the sources
of non-determinism, the CuDNN backend is configured in
deterministic mode (our experiments ran on a GeForce GTX
1080 Ti) with benchmark mode turned off. We also used log-
softmax + nll loss, which is equal to softmax + cross-entropy
loss, but with improved numerical stability on PyTorch.
We provide our code along with a script reproducing all
of our results, both the experiments and the graphs, in one
command. Details, including software and hardware depen-
dencies, are available in the supplementary material.
4.3. Experimental Results
For each of the pair model-dataset, we consider 5 variable
hyperparameters: which attack to test ((Baruch et al., 2019)
or (Xie et al., 2019)), which defense to run (Krum, Median
or Bulyan), how many Byzantine workers f to use (an half
or a quarter), where momentum is computed (at the server
or at the workers) and which learning rate ηt to apply.
We report on every possible combination of these hyperpa-
rameters, along with baselines that use averaging without
attack. With 5 repetitions per setup, the experiments consist
in 440 runs, aggregated and studied in the supplementary
material. In this section we report on a representative subset.
We made a concerning observation: one of the theoretical
requirement for Byzantine-resilience, equations (3) or (4),
is actually rarely satisfied in practice. In less than 2% of the
runs under attack was this theoretical condition satisfied for
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(a) Momentum at the server, ηt = 0.5
(b) Momentum at the workers, ηt = 0.5
Figure 2. MNIST and the associated model (Section 4.1), n = 51
and f = 12. The attack, (Baruch et al., 2019), has a tangible
impact (−15% on the maximum accuracy) in this setup. Using
momentum at the workers diminishes the effect of the attack, even
substantially when Bulyan is used (only 1% loss in accuracy).
(a) Momentum at the server, ηt =
{
0.01 if t < 1500
0.001 otherwise
(b) Momentum at the workers, ηt =
{
0.01 if t < 1500
0.001 otherwise
Figure 3. CIFAR-10 and the associated model (Section 4.1), with
n = 25 and f = 5. As in Figure 2, (Baruch et al., 2019) has a
strong impact on the training. The positive effect of momentum
at the workers (Figure 3b) is conspicuous and, as predicted by the
theory (Section 3.2), amplified with a lower learning rate.
(a) Momentum at the server, ηt =
{
0.01 if t < 1500
0.001 otherwise
(b) Momentum at the workers, ηt =
{
0.01 if t < 1500
0.001 otherwise
Figure 4. CIFAR-10 and the associated model (Section 4.1), with
n = 25 and f = 11 (Figure 3 uses f = 5). The attack, (Xie
et al., 2019), is extremely efficient when f ≈ n
2
, but had almost
no effect with f ≈ n
4
; the supplementary material has a more com-
plete range of experiments. Momentum at the workers noticeably
improves the cross-accuracy when Median is used in this setting.
(a) Attack (Xie et al., 2019), ηt =
{
0.01 if t < 1500
0.001 otherwise
(b) Attack (Xie et al., 2019), ηt = 0.001
Figure 5. CIFAR-10 and the associated model (Section 4.1), with
n = 25 and f = 5, showing a decreased variance-norm ratio when
momentum is computed at the workers. The benefit of a lower ηt
is clearly visible in (a), when its value is reduced at step 1500.
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at least 1 step, and none for more than 4 steps (out of 3000).
In most of the experiments, the observed variance-norm
ratio was often between 1 and 2 orders of magnitude too
high (e.g., Figure 5). Since our hyperparameters (model,
dataset, mini-batch size, n, f ) are very close, if not equal,
to those used in the experiments of (Baruch et al., 2019;
Xie et al., 2019), such a substantial margin (1 to 2 orders
of magnitude) lets us think the theoretical requirements for
Byzantine resilience were actually not satisfied either in
(Baruch et al., 2019; Xie et al., 2019). (Baruch et al., 2019)
reached the same conclusion, using a different experiment.
Result Analysis. With the largest, optimal learning rate,
we obtained with Krum and for both models very similar
maximum top-1 cross-accuracies to the ones obtained in
(Baruch et al., 2019)4, namely ∼80% for MNIST’s model
(Figure 2a) and ∼20% for CIFAR-10’s model (Figure 3a).
A similar observation can be made for (Xie et al., 2019): on
the CIFAR-10’s model, the maximum accuracies of Krum
and Median are respectively ∼10% and ∼20% (Figure 4a).
The benefit of computing momentum at the workers is vis-
ible in all the figures. Regarding the impact on the top-1
cross-accuracy, we systematically5 observe an increase com-
pared to when momentum is computed at the server (figures
2–4). The empirical increase ranges from +5%, on the
MNIST model attacked by (Baruch et al., 2019) (supple-
mentary material, Figure 3), to +50% on the CIFAR-10
model, defended by Median (Figure 3). Regarding the ef-
fect on the variance-norm ratio, we comparatively observe a
decrease of this ratio before approaching convergence. As
predicted by our theoretical analysis, this decrease can be
amplified by reducing the learning rate (Figure 5a).
5. Concluding Remarks
Momentum-based Variance Reduction. Our algorithm
is different from (Cutkosky & Orabona, 2019), as instead of
reducing the variance of the gradients, we actually increase
it (Equation (7)). What we seek to reduce is the variance-
norm ratio, which is the key quantity for any Byzantine-
resilient GAR approximating a high-dimensional median,
e.g. Krum, Median, Bulyan as well as in (Yang & Bajwa,
2019b;a; Chen et al., 2017; Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al., 2019)6.
Some of the ideas introduced in (Cutkosky & Orabona,
2019) could nevertheless help further improve Byzantine
resilience. For instance, introducing an adaptive learning
rate which decreases depending on the curvature of the
parameter trajectory is an appealing approach to further
reduce the variance-norm ratio (Equation (9)).
4Although (Baruch et al., 2019) uses Krum with m = 1 (see
Section 2.2.1), and not the exact same CIFAR-10 model.
5Except for Krum against (Xie et al., 2019) when f =
⌊
n−3
2
⌋
.
6This list is not exhaustive.
Further Work. The theoretical condition for ratio reduc-
tion, in Section 3.2, shows that momentum at the workers
is a double-edged sword. The intuition can be gained with
the classic analogy from physics: without Byzantine work-
ers, momentum makes the parameters θt somehow like
a particle travelling down the loss function with inertia.
When inside a “straight valley”, past estimation errors are
on average compensated in the next steps, dampening os-
cillations and accumulating the average descent direction.
The variance-norm ratio of the momentum gradient is then
reduced, mostly because its norm increases, which is quan-
tified by st. The problem is that st can become negative.
Intuitively with the particle analogy, this happens when the
loss is locally “curved”, for instance when approaching a
local minimum. The particle may start continuing “uphill”
instead of following the “valley”, and so, losing momen-
tum. The norm of the momentum gradient then decreases,
increasing the variance-norm ratio.
While the ability to cross narrow, local minima is recognized
as an accelerator (Goh, 2017), for the purpose of Byzantine-
resilience we want to ensure momentum at the workers does
not increase the variance-norm ratio compared to the classi-
cal, momentum at the server. The theoretical condition for
this purpose is given in Equation (8). One simple amend-
ment would then be to use momentum at the workers when
Equation (8) is satisfied, and fallback to computing it at the
server otherwise. Also, a more complex, possible future ap-
proach could be to dynamically adapt the momentum factor
µ, decreasing it as the curvature increases.
Asynchronous SGD. We focused in this work on the syn-
chronous setting, which received most of the attention in the
Byzantine-resilient literature. Yet, we believe our work can
be applied to asynchronous settings, as momentum is agnos-
tic to the question of synchrony. Specifically, combining our
idea with a filtering scheme such as Kardam (Damaskinos
et al., 2018) is in principle possible, as the filter commutes
with the basic operations of momentum. However, further
analysis of the interplay between the dynamics of stale gra-
dients and the dynamics of momentum remain necessary.
Byzantine Servers. While most of the research on
Byzantine-resilience gradient descent has focused on the
workers’ side, assuming a reliable server, recent efforts have
started tackling Byzantine servers (El-Mhamdi et al., 2019).
Our reduction of the variance-norm ratio strengthens the
gradient aggregation phase, which is necessary whether we
deal with Byzantine workers or Byzantine servers. An in-
teresting open question is how the momentum dynamics
affects the models drift between different parameter servers.
Any quantitative answer to this question will enable the
use of our method in fully decentralised Byzantine resilient
gradient descent.
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A. Reproducing the results
The codebase is available at https://github.com/
LPD-EPFL/ByzantineMomentum.
A.1. Dependencies
Software dependencies. Python 3.7.3 has been used to
run our scripts. Besides the standard libraries associated
with Python 3.7.3, our scripts also depend on:
Library Version
numpy 1.17.2
torch 1.2.0
torchvision 0.4.0
pandas 0.25.1
matplotlib 3.0.2
tqdm 4.40.2
PIL 6.1.0
Library Version
six 1.12.0
pytz 2019.3
dateutil 2.7.3
pyparsing 2.2.0
cycler 0.10.0
kiwisolver 1.0.1
cffi 1.13.2
We list below the OS on which our scripts have been tested:
• Debian 10 (GNU/Linux 4.19.0-6 x86 64)
• Ubuntu 18.04.3 LTS (GNU/Linux 4.15.0-58 x86 64)
Hardware dependencies. Although our experiments are
time-agnostic, we list below the hardware components used:
• 1 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-8700K CPU @ 3.70GHz
• 2 Nvidia GeForce GTX 1080 Ti
• 64 GB of RAM
A.2. Command
Our results, i.e. the experiments and graphs, are reproducible
in one command. In the root directory, please run:
$ python3 reproduce.py
On our hardware, reproducing the results takes ∼24 hours.
B. Experimental results
For every pair model-dataset, the following parameters vary:
• Which attack: (Baruch et al., 2019) or (Xie et al., 2019)
• Which defense: Krum, Median or Bulyan
• How many Byzantine workers (an half or a quarter)
• Where momentum is computed (server or workers)
• Which learning rate is used (larger or smaller)
Every possible combination is tested7, leading to a total of
88 different experiment setups. Each setup is tested 5 times,
each run with a fixed seed from 1 to 5, enabling verbatim
reproduction of our results8. We then report the average and
standard deviation for two metrics: top-1 cross-accuracy
and variance-norm ratio over the training steps.
The results regarding the cross-accuracy are layed out by
“blocks” of 4 experiment setups presenting the same model,
dataset, number of Byzantine workers and attack. These
results are presented from figures 6 to 13. In each “block”,
the 2 top experiments use the larger learning rate and the
2 bottom ones the smaller, so looking below correspond to
looking to the same experiment but with a smaller learning
rate (and vice versa). Similarly, the 2 left experiments use
momentum at the server, while the 2 right ones use momen-
tum at the workers, which allows for handy comparison of
the effect of using one technique over the other.
The results regarding the variance-norm ratio are also layed
out by “blocks” of 4 experiment setups presenting the same
model, dataset, number of Byzantine workers and defense.
These results are presented from figures 14 to 23. In each
“block”, the attack from (Baruch et al., 2019) is use on the
left column and (Xie et al., 2019) on the right. As for the
cross-accuracy, the top row use the larger learning rate and
the bottom row shows the effect of using a smaller one.
For figures 6 to 23, the captions present to the reader the
hyperparameters used in each of the experiments, along with
comments about the observed behaviors.
7Along with baselines using averaging without attack.
8Despite our best efforts, there may still exist minor sources of
non-determinism, like race-conditions in the evaluation of certain
functions (e.g., parallel additions) in a GPU. Nevertheless we
believe these should not affect the results in any significant way.
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(a) Momentum at the server, ηt = 0.5 (b) Momentum at the workers, ηt = 0.5
(c) Momentum at the server, ηt = 0.02 (d) Momentum at the workers, ηt = 0.02
Figure 6. MNIST using n = 51 workers, including f = 24 Byzantine workers implementing (Baruch et al., 2019). This is the maximum
number of Byzantine workers Krum can support. No matter where the momentum is computed, reducing the learning rate decreases the
effect of the attack against all the GARs. This is not observed, in the same setting, when (Xie et al., 2019) is used instead (Figure 8). No
matter the learning rate, using momentum at the workers always leads in these settings to an increase of the final accuracy (+5%).
(a) Momentum at the server, ηt = 0.5 (b) Momentum at the workers, ηt = 0.5
(c) Momentum at the server, ηt = 0.02 (d) Momentum at the workers, ηt = 0.02
Figure 7. MNIST using n = 51 workers, including f = 12 Byzantine workers implementing (Baruch et al., 2019). This is the maximum
number of Byzantine workers Bulyan can support. With momentum at the server and the largest learning rate, the impact of the attack
remains unchanged compared to Figure 6 and despite the reduced number of Byzantine workers. Bulyan, which combines Krum and
Median, achieves the same performance as both Krum and Median. When momentum is computed at the workers, Bulyan achieves in
these settings better resilience than its parts Krum and Median, and the attack has no tangible effect anymore.
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(a) Momentum at the server, ηt = 0.5 (b) Momentum at the workers, ηt = 0.5
(c) Momentum at the server, ηt = 0.02 (d) Momentum at the workers, ηt = 0.02
Figure 8. MNIST using n = 51 workers, including f = 24 Byzantine workers implementing (Xie et al., 2019). This is the maximum
number of Byzantine workers Krum can support. Contrary to Figure 6, this attack has very different impacts on the training depending on
the Byzantine-resilient GAR used. With Krum and momentum at the server, the model parameters quickly (after 30 steps) reach a point
where the output class becomes independent from the input; the model is driven useless. Momentum at the workers with Krum only
avoids obtaining such a model. Median shows substantially more resilience than Krum in this setup, and when momentum is computed at
the workers, the maximum cross-accuracy is consistently increased, between 15% to 25% additional points.
(a) Momentum at the server, ηt = 0.5 (b) Momentum at the workers, ηt = 0.5
(c) Momentum at the server, ηt = 0.02 (d) Momentum at the workers, ηt = 0.02
Figure 9. MNIST using n = 51 workers, including f = 12 Byzantine workers implementing (Xie et al., 2019). This is the maximum
number of Byzantine workers Bulyan can support. With a quarter of Byzantine workers, the attack does not have any tangible impact on
Krum (and thus none on Bulyan either) for this model and dataset anymore. Using momentum at the workers further reduces the impact
on Median, to the point of filtering out the adversarial effect of this attack.
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(a) Momentum at the server, ηt =
{
0.01 if t < 1500
0.001 otherwise
(b) Momentum at the workers, ηt =
{
0.01 if t < 1500
0.001 otherwise
(c) Momentum at the server, ηt = 0.001 (d) Momentum at the workers, ηt = 0.001
Figure 10. CIFAR-10 using n = 25 workers, including f = 11 Byzantine workers implementing (Baruch et al., 2019). This is the
maximum number of Byzantine workers Krum can support. Compared to Figure 6, the impact of the attack is substantial. Even with a
reduced learning rate, the model maximum cross-accuracy barely reaches 20%. Using momentum at the workers, while having virtually
no computational cost, positively impacts the performance of the model.
(a) Momentum at the server, ηt =
{
0.01 if t < 1500
0.001 otherwise
(b) Momentum at the workers, ηt =
{
0.01 if t < 1500
0.001 otherwise
(c) Momentum at the server, ηt = 0.001 (d) Momentum at the workers, ηt = 0.001
Figure 11. CIFAR-10 using n = 25 workers, including f = 5 Byzantine workers implementing (Baruch et al., 2019). This is the
maximum number of Byzantine workers Bulyan can support. The effect of going to only a quarter of Byzantine workers, compared to
Figure 10, did not made the attack less effective. Conversely, momentum at the workers leads to a conspicuous improvement of the model
performance.
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(a) Momentum at the server, ηt =
{
0.01 if t < 1500
0.001 otherwise
(b) Momentum at the workers, ηt =
{
0.01 if t < 1500
0.001 otherwise
(c) Momentum at the server, ηt = 0.001 (d) Momentum at the workers, ηt = 0.001
Figure 12. CIFAR-10 using n = 25 workers, including f = 11 Byzantine workers implementing (Xie et al., 2019). This is the maximum
number of Byzantine workers Krum can support. As in Figure 8, the attack is extremely effective on Krum and slightly less on Median.
Momentum at the workers has a substantial positive effect when Median is used.
(a) Momentum at the server, ηt =
{
0.01 if t < 1500
0.001 otherwise
(b) Momentum at the workers, ηt =
{
0.01 if t < 1500
0.001 otherwise
(c) Momentum at the server, ηt = 0.001 (d) Momentum at the workers, ηt = 0.001
Figure 13. CIFAR-10 using n = 25 workers, including f = 5 Byzantine workers implementing (Xie et al., 2019). This is the maximum
number of Byzantine workers Bulyan can support. With a reduced fraction of Byzantine workers to a quarter compared to Figure 12, the
effect of the attack is almost void. Notably in this setting, Bulyan improves the cross-accuracy gain per step over Krum and Median.
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(a) Attack (Baruch et al., 2019), ηt = 0.5 (b) Attack (Xie et al., 2019), ηt = 0.5
(c) Attack (Baruch et al., 2019), ηt = 0.02 (d) Attack (Xie et al., 2019), ηt = 0.02
Figure 14. MNIST using n = 51 workers, including f = 24 Byzantine workers defended against by Krum. This setting contains the full
range of behaviors one can observe in the subsequent figures. One first, notable behavior was predicted by the theory: until convergence is
reached, reducing the learning rate decreases the variance-norm ratio. The second, recurrent behavior is that, when the model is driven
useless (Figure 8), the ratio reaches low values. Such decreasing curves (14b and 14d) are empirical, distinctive signal of a very successful
attack. Indeed for a successful defense, one should expect the ratio to grow to infinity, as the norm of the honest gradient goes toward 0.
(a) Attack (Baruch et al., 2019), ηt = 0.5 (b) Attack (Xie et al., 2019), ηt = 0.5
(c) Attack (Baruch et al., 2019), ηt = 0.02 (d) Attack (Xie et al., 2019), ηt = 0.02
Figure 15. MNIST using n = 51 workers, including f = 12 Byzantine workers defended against by Krum. See Figure 14.
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(a) Attack (Baruch et al., 2019), ηt =
{
0.01 if t < 1500
0.001 otherwise
(b) Attack (Xie et al., 2019), ηt =
{
0.01 if t < 1500
0.001 otherwise
(c) Attack (Baruch et al., 2019), ηt = 0.001 (d) Attack (Xie et al., 2019), ηt = 0.001
Figure 16. CIFAR-10 using n = 25 workers, including f = 11 Byzantine workers defended against by Krum. See Figure 14.
(a) Attack (Baruch et al., 2019), ηt =
{
0.01 if t < 1500
0.001 otherwise
(b) Attack (Xie et al., 2019), ηt =
{
0.01 if t < 1500
0.001 otherwise
(c) Attack (Baruch et al., 2019), ηt = 0.001 (d) Attack (Xie et al., 2019), ηt = 0.001
Figure 17. CIFAR-10 using n = 25 workers, including f = 5 Byzantine workers defended against by Krum. The “fracture” is due to the
fact that the learning rate is decreased at step 1500. See Figure 14.
Distributed Momentum for Byzantine-resilient Learning
(a) Attack (Baruch et al., 2019), ηt = 0.5 (b) Attack (Xie et al., 2019), ηt = 0.5
(c) Attack (Baruch et al., 2019), ηt = 0.02 (d) Attack (Xie et al., 2019), ηt = 0.02
Figure 18. MNIST using n = 51 workers, including f = 24 Byzantine workers defended against by Median. See Figure 14.
(a) Attack (Baruch et al., 2019), ηt = 0.5 (b) Attack (Xie et al., 2019), ηt = 0.5
(c) Attack (Baruch et al., 2019), ηt = 0.02 (d) Attack (Xie et al., 2019), ηt = 0.02
Figure 19. MNIST using n = 51 workers, including f = 12 Byzantine workers defended against by Median. See Figure 14.
Distributed Momentum for Byzantine-resilient Learning
(a) Attack (Baruch et al., 2019), ηt =
{
0.01 if t < 1500
0.001 otherwise
(b) Attack (Xie et al., 2019), ηt =
{
0.01 if t < 1500
0.001 otherwise
(c) Attack (Baruch et al., 2019), ηt = 0.001 (d) Attack (Xie et al., 2019), ηt = 0.001
Figure 20. CIFAR-10 using n = 25 workers, including f = 11 Byzantine workers defended against by Median. See Figure 14.
(a) Attack (Baruch et al., 2019), ηt =
{
0.01 if t < 1500
0.001 otherwise
(b) Attack (Xie et al., 2019), ηt =
{
0.01 if t < 1500
0.001 otherwise
(c) Attack (Baruch et al., 2019), ηt = 0.001 (d) Attack (Xie et al., 2019), ηt = 0.001
Figure 21. CIFAR-10 using n = 25 workers, including f = 5 Byzantine workers defended against by Median. See Figure 14.
Distributed Momentum for Byzantine-resilient Learning
(a) Attack (Baruch et al., 2019), ηt = 0.5 (b) Attack (Xie et al., 2019), ηt = 0.5
(c) Attack (Baruch et al., 2019), ηt = 0.02 (d) Attack (Xie et al., 2019), ηt = 0.02
Figure 22. MNIST using n = 51 workers, including f = 12 Byzantine workers defended against by Bulyan. See Figure 14.
(a) Attack (Baruch et al., 2019), ηt =
{
0.01 if t < 1500
0.001 otherwise
(b) Attack (Xie et al., 2019), ηt =
{
0.01 if t < 1500
0.001 otherwise
(c) Attack (Baruch et al., 2019), ηt = 0.001 (d) Attack (Xie et al., 2019), ηt = 0.001
Figure 23. CIFAR-10 using n = 25 workers, including f = 5 Byzantine workers defended against by Bulyan. See Figure 14.
